Determinants and consequences of budget reallocations by Grabner, Isabella & Moers, Frank
Department of Strategy and Innovation 
Working Paper No. 05/2020 
Determinants and consequences 
of budget reallocations 
Isabella Grabner
Frank Moers
January 2020 
  
 
Determinants and consequences of budget reallocations 
 
 
 
 
 
ISABELLA GRABNER, WU Vienna 
 
FRANK MOERS, Maastricht University School of Business and Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
We gratefully appreciate the comments and suggestions made by Margaret Abernethy (editor), 
three anonymous referees, Jan Bouwens, Clara Chen, Angelo Ditillo, Christoph Feichter, Otto 
Janschek, Stijn Masschelein, and workshop participants at the 2015 GMARS conference in 
Copenhagen, the 2016 Conference on Quantitative Empirical Research on Management 
Accounting in Shanghai, the 2016 New Directions in Management Accounting Conference in 
Brussels, KU Leuven, Maastricht University, Tulane University, and WU Vienna. We are also 
grateful to the senior managers at the company who supplied data for the analysis and granted us 
extensive access to the research site and its employees. 
 
 
 
 
* Address for correspondence: Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, 
Department of Accounting and Information Management, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, 
The Netherlands. 
 (P) +31433884629; (F) +31433884876; (Email) f.moers@maastrichtuniversity.nl 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Determinants and consequences of budget reallocations 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the determinants and consequences of budget reallocations, i.e., corrective actions 
to the budget made during the year. Using proprietary data of a large consumer goods 
manufacturer, we analyze the extent to which allocation decisions regarding the initial budget drive 
subsequent reallocations. Whenever scarce resources need to be allocated among a number of 
individuals, power struggles and politicking behavior are likely to arise, which potentially affects 
the outcome of the allocation process. We hypothesize and find that one important driver of 
reallocation decisions is the firm’s aim to correct for systematic deviations from the optimal initial 
budget allocation that are driven by successful lobbying activities during the initial budgeting 
process. In a more exploratory analysis, we show that such reallocations do not have the desired 
effects on market-place performance. In particular, budget cuts are negatively associated with a 
product’s change in market share. More surprisingly, while budget boosts do help product lines 
internally to achieve their sales targets in the last quarter, they do not have a (positive) effect on 
the change in market share. Most importantly, our results demonstrate that efficient investment 
planning ex ante is essential to achieve an improvement in market-place performance, highlighting 
the value of budgeting.  
 
Key words: budgeting, efficient budget allocation, budget reallocation, rent-seeking 
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1. Introduction  
Firms invest a remarkable amount of resources into the annual budgeting process to ensure the 
most efficient allocation of scarce resources among organizational entities (e.g., Libby and Lindsay 
2010). Given the increasing uncertainty in the environment and complexity of operations, it is not 
surprising that many companies allow for the option to reallocate resources across entities even 
after the initial resource allocation has taken place as they update their beliefs about the expected 
(relative) performance of the budgeted entities. Most reallocation decisions are triggered by 
external events that require an immediate response, typically in terms of a budget boost. Given the 
scarcity of resources, the crucial challenge is that such reallocation decisions cannot be made in 
isolation. This is because changes to the budget of one entity typically require the initial budget 
allocation of other budget entities to be reconsidered as well.  
When management has to decide on whose budget to cut to free up the needed resources, they 
are confronted with the trade-off between increasing the opportunities for one entity and harming 
the success of another. In this study, we investigate the extent to which management takes the 
initial budget allocation process into account when making this difficult decision. In particular, 
once confronted with a reallocation decision, do the decision makers use this opportunity to try to 
correct for errors made in the initial allocation? While such errors can be caused by a number of 
reasons, prior research shows that one important cause relates to power struggles and politicking 
behavior (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000, Wulf 2009). In particular, 
systematic deviations from the optimal initial budget allocation (i.e., misallocations) have been 
shown to be partly due to successful rent-seeking behavior of “weaker” entities, i.e., entities with 
lower productivity in terms of, for example, lower growth potential actively lobbying for more 
resources than warranted (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Such behavior is often successful 
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as lower level managers can exploit their informational advantages over top management 
regarding the performance expectations and growth opportunities of their respective entities. We 
argue that one important driver of reallocation decisions is the firm’s aim to correct for systematic 
deviations from the optimal initial budget allocation (i.e., misallocations) that are driven by 
successful lobbying activities during the initial budgeting process. We expect that, in the presence 
of cross-subsidization of weaker entities by stronger ones during the initial budget allocation, 
initial misallocations influence the likelihood of budget cuts in an attempt to achieve a more 
efficient budget allocation in the reallocation process. Over the course of the budgeting period, 
some (but not all) of the uncertainties of the initial budget allocation typically resolve. This 
increases the likelihood that management can identify potential rent-seekers, which we argue are 
then more likely to be cut if resources are needed elsewhere. Although the ultimate purpose of 
reallocations is to increase the efficiency of the invested capital, whether this materializes is an 
open question, which is why we also explore the performance consequences of budget 
reallocations. 
Using the example of the marketing budget allocation process among product line managers 
and proprietary data of a large consumer goods manufacturer, we apply the allocation method 
developed by Fischer, Albers, Wagner and Frie (2011) to determine the near-optimal initial 
allocation of a fixed marketing budget across a diverse product line portfolio. We use this model 
to determine the optimal allocation (share) of marketing investments, as well as deviations thereof 
(i.e., misallocations). A misallocation refers to the fraction of the budget share that is 
disproportionate to the product line‘s growth potential, sales elasticities, and the other 
characteristics accounted for in the allocation model.  
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Given that the theory that we test regarding budget reallocations relies on (i) the presence of 
cross-subsidization in the initial budget allocation that is (ii) driven by rent-seeking, we first 
validate its existence in two ways. First, we show that (1) misallocations with respect to the optimal 
allocation rule indeed consist of systematic deviations consistent with cross-subsidization, rather 
than largely being random allocation errors, and (2) this cross-subsidization cannot be explained 
by managers’ cognitive bias for equal allocation (naïve diversification), leaving successful rent-
seeking behavior as the most likely explanation for this phenomenon. Second, given that rent-
seeking implies that weaker entities are more likely to be over-allocated and not able to exploit 
this resource advantage, we hypothesize and show that, on average, over-allocation is negatively 
associated with subsequent sales performance. Likewise, on average, the more under-allocated 
entities are, the worse they perform, as they increasingly lack the necessary resources to 
sufficiently reach their customers. To further corroborate our theoretical assumptions, we develop 
a proxy for the productivity (“strength”) of a product line, which allows us to identify product lines 
with a higher likelihood of being rent-seekers (“weak”) and product lines with a higher likelihood 
of being subsidizers (“strong”). We then show that the relation between over-/under-allocation and 
sales performance is significantly different for “weak” versus “strong” product lines in a way 
consistent with (only) weaker product lines engaging in rent-seeking behavior.  
In our main analysis we find that – as hypothesized - deviations from the optimal initial budget 
share drive reallocations, but that this effect is asymmetric, at least on average. While initially 
over-allocated entities are, on average, indeed more likely to be cut, entities that in the initial 
budgeting process receive less than the optimal allocation rule predicts, are not more likely to 
receive extra resources. Subsequent analysis again shows significant differences between weak 
and strong product lines in a way consistent with reallocation decisions being driven by rent-
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seeking behavior during the initial budgeting process. Importantly, as we control for the sales 
development as well as changes in contribution margins during the year, we are able to separate 
the direct effect of initial misallocations on reallocation decisions in an attempt to achieve a more 
efficient budget allocation in the reallocation process from the expected corrections for realized 
sales and profit performance of the product lines.   
In a more exploratory analysis, we finally analyze the consequences of budget reallocations for 
market-place performance. We show that reallocations do not have the desired effects on market-
place performance, which suggest that managers plan with the resources they initially are 
allocated. Thus, receiving more resources than expected does not make managers use this money 
efficiently with respect to the external competition, while those that got cut are not able to stick to 
their plans, which in turn leads to performance decreases on the market.  
Although budgeting is one of the most extensively studied topics in management accounting 
research, we are able to contribute to this literature by providing insights into a so far unexplored 
part of the budgeting process, i.e., the determinants and consequences of reallocations of the initial 
budget during the year. Given the increasing uncertainty in the environment and complexity of 
operations, the initial budgeting process becomes more difficult, and more and more firms believe 
to benefit from allowing some flexibility after the initial budget is set. Examples are the use of 
flexible and rolling budgets or forecasts to complement the annual budget (see for example 
Merchant and Van der Stede 2012). Usually, these tools aim to improve the planning and 
coordination process, and ultimately performance of the various budgeted entities by incorporating 
information that becomes available after the annual budget is set. Importantly, the option to 
incorporate new information affects the allocation of a fixed pool of resources among budgetary 
entities, given that resources are scarce and changes in one entity expand to changes in other 
 5 
 
entities. This triggers two important, yet so far unexplored questions. First, what drives the 
reallocation decision among budgeted entities? We contribute to the literature by showing that one 
important reason for reallocations is to correct for inefficiencies that occurred during the initial 
budget allocation process that are driven by rent-seeking behavior. Most importantly, we show 
that reallocations are not just a reaction to the weaker entities’ poor performance development, but 
to the initial over-allocations per se. This highlights the importance of taking a dynamic 
perspective to budgeting in general, and gaming behavior in particular. Second, while allowing 
some flexibility after the initial budget is set aims at improving performance, the question is 
whether it does. We contribute to the literature by showing that reallocations do not have the 
intended effects and cannot undo the negative effects of “poor” budgeting. Our results demonstrate 
that efficient investment planning ex ante is essential to achieve an improvement in performance, 
explaining the high amount of time and money that a lot of firms put into their budgeting process. 
These findings are in line with the practitioners’ view that the planning and coordination role of 
budgets might be even more important than their use for control purposes (Sivabalan, Booth, 
Malmi and Brown 2009).  
2. Prior literature and hypotheses 
The budget allocation process 
Firms invest a remarkable amount of resources into the annual budgeting process to ensure the 
most efficient allocation of scarce resources (e.g., money, management attention) among 
organizational processes (e.g., Libby and Lindsay 2010). Correspondingly, the efficient and 
effective allocation of resources is one of the most important responsibilities of (top) managers to 
maximize firm value. However, without complete information about relative growth opportunities, 
intra-firm resource allocation is one of the most difficult responsibilities (Wulf, 2009). An 
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emerging stream of research on internal capital markets has pointed at the difficulties of efficient 
intra-firm resource allocation, as well as the determinants and consequences of misallocations 
(Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000, Wulf 2009). In particular, the aim 
is to gain insights into the budget negotiations between headquarters and its divisions and explain 
the systematics of budget allocations among organizational entities. Several studies in corporate 
finance (e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995, Ozbas and Scharfstein 2010) have documented that multi-
divisional firms tend to engage in cross-subsidization, i.e., “spending relatively too much in some 
divisions, and too little in others” (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000, p. 2538). According to Scharfstein 
and Stein (2000), cross-subsidies are prone to be ‘socialist’ in nature, because stronger entities end 
up subsidizing weaker ones. Therefore, overinvestment in one division has the consequence of 
underinvestment in another, more profitable, division.  
The most common explanation for the subsidization of underperforming entities is that such 
deviations from the optimal allocation decisions are a consequence of managers successfully 
engaging in rent-seeking activities; that is, actively lobbying the CEO for more resources, 
compensation and power (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In particular, division managers 
need to allocate their effort between running their division, which tends to create value for the 
firm, and lobbying the CEO, which tends to attract resources for the division at the expense of firm 
value. In line with cross-subsidization, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) find that rent-seeking is mostly 
undertaken by managers of weaker divisions, as the opportunity costs of taking time away from 
productive work is lower for these managers. On top of empire-building preferences that managers 
are claimed to have (e.g., Stein 2003), especially managers of weaker entities have incentives to 
rent-seek as receiving more resources than warranted helps them in achieving their targets, i.e., 
target difficulty decreases. Such rent-seeking behavior is also often successful. This is because 
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lower level managers have an informational advantage over top management regarding their 
respective divisions’ (external) environment and thus can better assess (and also deliberately 
overstate) performance expectations and growth opportunities. Thus, top management lacks 
private information on the expected value of the proposed investments and typically also the 
resources to carefully audit every request for funds, which is why rent-seeking activities during 
the initial resource allocation process are difficult to detect (Bardolet, Fox and Lovallo, 2011, 
p.1466).  
While some of these uncertainties will resolve over time, it is also important to note that even 
over the course of the budgeting period the informational advantage of division managers is likely 
to persist. This implies that rent-seeking behavior remains difficult to detect ex post and the 
probability that rent-seekers will be identified and potentially punished (either in the current period 
via a cut of the current budget or via a lower budget in a future period) is not one.1 Given the 
incentive to rent-seek and the inherent difficulty of detecting it, it can be expected that – in 
equilibrium - many but not all managers of weak entities will rent-seek, and some but not all of 
these will be detected. This further implies that the incentives and opportunities to rent-seek in a 
future period are still present (especially for the ones that have not been detected). Overall, it is 
safe to assume that not all information and agency problems can be resolved even with the highest 
investment in information acquisition and incentive design and thus that (some) rent-seeking 
behavior will sustain “in equilibrium” (Stein 2003, p. 113). 
                                                 
1 For example, while management can identify that a division manager has not met her performance expectations, it 
is often not clear why this occurred. For example, it could be due to being a weak entity per se or because of being a 
typically strong entity with bad luck / other external factors. Given that weak entities will do everything to disguise 
their weakness (for example in finding excuses for their shortcomings), management cannot perfectly identify rent- 
seeking behavior.  
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Besides the claim that cross-subsidization is driven by rent-seeking, Bardolet et al. (2011) 
propose that cross-subsidization will be observed even in the absence of any agency conflicts. In 
particular, they argue that managers have a cognitive, not necessarily conscious, bias towards even 
allocation, implying that benefits and costs are allocated relatively evenly among divisions, 
irrespective of their relative investment opportunities. Consistent with this prediction, they show 
that the number of divisions and the relative size of the division within the firm are related to 
budget allocations, after controlling for measures of the divisions’ expected productivity. They 
conclude that cross-subsidization might not only be the result of stronger entities subsidizing 
weaker entities because of rent-seeking behavior, but more generally the result of subsidization of 
divisions that are less deserving of capital by more deserving ones. Finally, while cross-
subsidization in general reflects a systematic deviation from the optimal budget allocation, it is 
highly likely that there will also be random errors in initial allocation decisions due to the inherent 
uncertainty and incomplete information about relative investment opportunities (Wulf 2009).   
The marketing budget  
One category of expenses that has to be planned in the annual budget is marketing spending. Such 
expenses include, among others, advertising or media, sales promotions, and physical distribution 
(Schwartz 2003). This “marketing portion of the budget considers what resources are to be used, 
and in what mix, to move products from the firm to its customers” (Schwartz 2003, p. 207). 
Interestingly, research in marketing suggests that – given that the ultimate impact of marketing 
expenditures on firm performance is hard to predict ex ante and even difficult to evaluate ex post 
(Schwartz 2003) - marketing budgeting is a process characterized by social interaction and 
negotiation for resources (Piercy 1987). Accordingly, the organizational politicking involved in 
the marketing budgeting process is argued “to act as just the type of internal capital market that 
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organizational theorists have associated with the multidivisional form” of an organization (Piercy 
1987, p. 56). Thus, politicking behavior can be expected to be a natural part of the annual 
marketing budgeting process where product (line) managers are given a lot of opportunity to 
influence the initial budget allocation. Relatedly, previous research on marketing budget decisions 
shows that not the level of investment matters, but rather how the money is invested (e.g., Mantrala, 
Sinha and Zoltners 1992). Indeed, financial performance has been shown to be more sensitive to 
allocation decisions compared to investment levels (e.g., Tull, Wood, Duhan, Gillpatick, 
Robertson and Helgeson 1986; Mantrala et al. 1992; Fischer et al. 2011). Thus, resource allocation 
decisions, i.e., how to spread the fixed amount of money available for marketing activities among 
the given products, are of major concern to top management.  
Hypotheses 
Misallocation and rent-seeking behavior of weaker divisions 
As discussed in detail above, research has shown that the initial budget allocation is likely to be 
distorted, in the sense that stronger entities end up cross-subsidizing weaker entities. Next to 
managers’ potential bias for equal allocation (Bardolet et. al 2011), we argue that misallocations 
of the initial budget due to cross-subsidization are also driven by rent-seeking behavior of weaker 
entities. Given the discretionary nature of the marketing budget, politicking behavior can be 
expected to be a natural part of the annual budgeting process because managers are given a lot of 
opportunity to influence the initial budget allocation where they can exploit their informational 
advantages (Piercy 1987, Bernardo, Cai and Luo, 2004). Especially weaker entities have incentives 
for rent-seeking, and as explained above, such lobbying behavior is often successful (Rajan et al. 
2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000, Wulf 2009). This implies that after the initial budget allocation, 
stronger entities are likely to be allocated an on average smaller share of the budget than would be 
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optimal, while weaker entities on average receive more money to spend than warranted by their 
economic characteristics. 
This observation has important implications for the entities’ performance development during 
the year. The previous discussion on cross-subsidization has pointed out that cross-subsidized 
entities, i.e., over-allocated entities, are more likely to be less productive (weaker) types, and 
therefore more likely to perform poorly. In particular, under the assumption that sales plans do not 
systematically take the relative strength of entities into account, over-allocated entities are less 
likely to achieve their plans, even with relatively more resources because they are unable to exploit 
their resource advantage.2 Therefore, a negative association between current over-allocation and 
future sales performance compared to plans is consistent with misallocations being driven by 
cross-subsidization due to rent-seeking rather than dominated by random errors due to uncertainty. 
Given that we expect that cross-subsidization due to rent-seeking behavior is an important driver 
of misallocations, we expect that over-allocation is associated with subsequent lower sales 
performance as compared to plans. 
 HYPOTHESIS 1a: Over-allocation regarding the optimal initial budget share is negatively 
 associated with subsequent sales performance as compared to plans.  
Under the same assumption that sales plans do not systematically take the strength of entities 
into account, the effect of under-allocation on subsequent sales performance is not as straight-
forward. On the one hand, it can be argued that under-allocated entities are on average the more 
                                                 
2 This assumption holds in our empirical setting. More specifically, sales plans are set by headquarters prior to the 
allocation of the marketing budget, without the involvement of the managers of the “entities”, and the plans are mostly 
driven by corporate political pressure – as is typical for firms that face extensive pressures to meet or beat the 
communicated corporate targets (see also Feichter, Grabner and Moers 2018). All these factors suggest that the plans 
do not take into account the weakness or strength of the entities but rather are anchored on some common corporate 
target. As a result, all else equal, sales plans are “too difficult” for weak entities and “too easy” for strong ones. We 
elaborate more on the process of setting sales plans when we describe the empirical setting, as well as in the conclusion 
section. 
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productive and more successful entities, and therefore able to outperform their plans, even with 
less resources. However, one can also argue that under-allocated entities are not able to outperform 
their plans because the under-allocation is too severe and they thus lack the necessary resources to 
sufficiently reach their customers. Which effect dominates is an empirical question, and therefore 
we state the hypothesis in the non-directional form. 
 HYPOTHESIS 1b: Under-allocation regarding the optimal initial budget share is
 associated with subsequent sales performance as compared to plans. 
Determinants of reallocation decisions 
In response to the increasing uncertainty with respect to competition and customer demands, more 
and more companies allow for (top) management to reallocate resources among activities during 
the budgeting period as they update their beliefs about the (relative) expected performance of the 
budget items. In other words, new information on the entities’ sales and profit development 
throughout the year can trigger the need for corrective actions in order to optimize the bottom 
lines. However, reacting to a contingency in one entity typically requires changes in another (given 
that reallocations involve at least two parties). Therefore, the reallocation process expands to the 
decision of who to cut when additional money is needed for certain entities to address the shocks 
they have been exposed to. In making this difficult decision, we expect that management will take 
the initial budget allocation process into account. During the initial budgeting process, many 
allocation decisions have to be taken with incomplete information due to resource constraints and 
time pressure (Bernardo, Cai and Luo, 2004), which leads to misallocations caused by, among 
others, rent-seeking behavior, as discussed above. At the outset, management lacks private 
information on the expected value of the proposed investments and resources to carefully audit 
every request for funds (Bardolet et al. 2011, p.1466). However, we expect that over time some of 
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the uncertainties regarding the stated investment opportunities resolve, either by observing realized 
performance or by obtaining more accurate information on expected market developments.3 Thus, 
in its reallocation decisions, management will attempt to take resources away from managers that 
have been identified to have overstated their investment prospects to restore efficiency.  
One important reason why a potential correction of rent-seeking activities is likely is that the 
nature of the budget reallocation process differs substantially from the initial budget allocation 
process. This is because reallocations are typically triggered by external events that require an 
immediate response. Examples of such events are the unexpected drop-out of a competitor, or an 
unexpected change in customer preferences. Thus, the response strategies need to be formulated 
ad hoc and the decision whether to reallocate resources is usually urgent, which limits the number 
of lower level managers (i.e., potential rent-seekers) that will be involved.4 Thus, in contrast to the 
initial budgeting process that is characterized by ongoing negotiations between a large number of 
(self-interested) participants (e.g., Hanson, Otley and Van der Stede 2003, Libby and Lindsay 
2010), reallocation decisions during the budgeting period are likely to be executed within a much 
smaller scope as compared to the initial process, partly because of resource constraints. In sum, 
when management reallocates resources among entities in order to exploit arising opportunities 
and react to changes in the market place, the organizational politicking will be less pronounced 
during this process than during the initial budgeting process. Consequently, we expect that the 
decisions on whom to cut to free up the needed money is less likely to be affected by lobbying 
behavior, which makes the budget cuts of weaker entities (who typically are the rent-seekers) more 
                                                 
3  For example, a manager might have (deliberately) drawn a too pessimistic picture regarding changes in the 
preferences of the target group that s/he claims require extra marketing efforts, but these changes never materialized.  
4 For example, reallocation decisions at our research site are made by the management committee together with the 
controlling department. Product line managers who are in charge of the budgets to be potentially cut are typically not 
involved in this process. Further, our interview with an industry expert also confirms that reallocation decisions are 
typically made ad hoc by upper-level management given their urgency. See also Section 3.  
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likely. In particular, we expect that those entities that got more than optimal during the initial 
budget allocation process, i.e., the weaker entities that were successful with their rent-seeking 
initiatives, are more likely to be cut during the reallocation process in an attempt to correct for 
such initially distorted allocations. As discussed above, given the inherent difficulty of detecting 
rent-seeking behavior even ex post we do not expect that management will identify each and every 
rent-seeking activity. However, we do expect that in determining budget cuts they will prioritize 
those entities that they have identified as potential rent-seekers. Following the same logic, we 
predict that under-allocated entities that got less than they should have are less likely to be cut.5 
Stated formally:  
HYPOTHESIS 2a: Over-allocation regarding the optimal initial budget share increases 
the likelihood of subsequent budget cuts. 
HYPOTHESIS 2b: Under-allocation regarding the optimal initial budget share decreases 
the likelihood of subsequent budget cuts.  
The purpose of reallocations is to increase the efficiency of the invested capital, ultimately 
increasing overall firm performance. If budget reallocations indeed correct, at least partly, for 
initial misallocations, one can expect positive performance effects of the redistribution of capital, 
particularly for the entities that receive an additional share of the capital. However, misallocations 
in the first place are assumed to harm performance (Scharfstein and Stein 2000, Wulf 2009), and 
it is not clear to what extent subsequent corrections can mitigate these negative effects. Therefore, 
it is an empirical question if and in which direction budget reallocations impact the affected 
                                                 
5 To be complete, the same reasoning applies when money becomes available. That is, initially under-allocated entities 
will be assigned more of the surplus capital. This scenario is, however, less likely given that we expect that the trigger 
for reallocations is a capital demand, rather than a capital surplus.  
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entities’ performance. To explore the performance consequences of budget reallocations, we state 
the following non-directional hypothesis.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Budget reallocation is associated with subsequent performance. 
3. The Research Site: ConsumerCo 
We conduct a field study with ConsumerCo, one of the divisions of a multinational corporation 
operating in the fast-moving consumer goods industry, which we refer to as MotherCo.6 With its 
approximately 30 product lines, ConsumerCo is among the largest divisions of MotherCo. The 
consumer goods industry is characterized by the substitutability of its products. Therefore, it is a 
marketing-driven industry, making market and media presence a top priority. ConsumerCo spends 
about 50 percent of yearly net sales on marketing in order to maintain or increase the market share 
of its product lines and to keep up with fierce competition. Consequently, the market share of each 
division is an important measurement tool for overall firm performance compared to its 
competitors. Not surprisingly, marketing is the largest yearly expenditure of ConsumerCo, and 
consequently has a marked effect on the ultimate bottom line. The marketing budget is also used 
as a control and steering tool for the division. Frequent evaluations of budgeted versus actual 
expenses are performed and budget reallocations are executed when necessary.7 
The Budgeting Process 
                                                 
6 The information presented in this section is based on interviews with the managing director, the head of controlling 
and business controllers of ConsumerCo as well as secondary documents received from ConsumerCo. 
7 To ensure that the budgeting process at our research site is representative of the entire industry, we conducted an 
interview with a global key account manager at one of the largest global media agencies world-wide, who in the last 
ten years has gained insights into the budgeting process of a large amount of companies that are comparable to our 
research site, in terms of size, business model and industry. The manager confirmed that changes to the initial budgets 
are in most cases indeed an explicitly documented feature of the budgeting processes of their clients, and shifts 
between product lines during the year are typical, and seen as an attempt to most efficiently use the scarce resources 
– where they are most needed and/or promise the highest returns. We are therefore confident that the budgeting process 
at our research site represents the state-of-the art in the consumer goods industry, rather than an exception. 
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The marketing budget for ConsumerCo is determined in the course of the annual sales budgeting 
process of MotherCo in which sales and profit plans as well as the corresponding marketing 
budgets are set. While the market share at all different levels of aggregation is considered the most 
important performance indicator (KPI) which is closely monitored, no explicit targets are set, as 
these are implicitly captured by the sales plans. It is important to note that MotherCo keeps strict 
control over the division’s operations, and makes use of its final decision rights to approve the 
budgets. The budgeting process is initiated at least three months before the start of the next fiscal 
year. In a first step, the sales and profit plans are set in a rather strict top-down process from the 
headquarters’ view. MotherCo first sets “top line” sales and profit plans on corporate level, which 
are then broken down to the divisions and further down to the individual product lines, which is 
our unit of analysis. According to our interviews, the management committee of ConsumerCo has 
very little influence on their final sales and profit plans. For example, one of the management 
committee members stated: “We can make recommendations and are involved in the discussions, 
but in the end the political pressure (from Headquarters) will set the targets.” Product line 
managers are not at all involved in the sales and profit planning process. 
Once the sales and profit plans are finalized, MotherCo communicates the annual sales plans. 
Based on these plans, the marketing budget is then developed in a bottom-up/top-down process 
from the headquarters’ view. Within the divisions, based on the input gathered from the product 
line managers, the marketing budget is developed by the controlling department in cooperation 
with the managing committee of the division. This budget is then proposed to headquarters; yet 
the ultimate authorization power for the budget belongs to MotherCo. MotherCo does not take part 
in the allocation process to the different product lines within a division. However, it can propose 
changes to the budget in the finalization stage. At the division level, the primary use of the budget 
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is for planning purposes. As the marketing budget is not set per product, but per product line, the 
product line managers have freedom in deciding how to spend their budget. That is, product line 
managers get allocated a marketing budget and can decide on the mix of activities as long as they 
do not overspend the authorized budget.8 
After the marketing budget is approved by MotherCo, the spending level per product line is 
normally fixed. Nevertheless, the managing director of ConsumerCo, together with the controlling 
department, can request changes in the budget. Therefore, shifts within and between the budgets 
of the different product lines (i.e., reallocations) occur during the business year. This not only 
enables the management of the bottom line, but also the exploitation of arising opportunities and 
the reaction to changes in the market place. It is important to note that the sales plan is used as a 
control and steering tool for the division, and the controlling department plays an important role 
in this process. The business controllers perform frequent, sometimes even weekly, evaluations of 
product line performance, that is, closely monitor the firm’s three most important key performance 
indicators (KPIs), i.e., market-share, net sales, and product line profit, as well as track budgeted 
versus actual marketing expenses.  
Performance evaluation and incentives 
The management committee of ConsumerCo has explicit incentive contracts based on sales target 
achievement and market share on aggregate division level. While there are no explicit performance 
targets linked to the achievement of the profit targets, these are taken into account in the overall 
evaluation of the management committee’s managerial performance. Thus, while the achievement 
of sales targets dominates, the management committee has still strong incentives to also achieve 
                                                 
8 This further implies that the managing committee does not impose specific marketing activities on the product lines 
and thus also does not impose a particular cost structure on the product lines. This rules out that systematic over-
/under-allocations can be explained by significant fixed marketing costs by product lines. Any particular cost structure 
is the result of decisions made by product line managers following the allocated marketing budget. 
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the profit targets. This implies that the division’s management committee that is responsible for 
the marketing budget (re)allocation has incentives to ensure an efficient budget allocation that 
maximizes the division’s (sales) performance and in turn, their own compensation. Product line 
managers do not have explicit incentives based on the achievement of the sales plans for their 
respective product lines. However, it is an important component of the product line manager’s 
performance evaluation at year end, and one of the most important factors in promotion decisions.  
Field evidence regarding rent-seeking and its role in the reallocation process 
Given the inherent difficulty of capturing rent-seeking, we provide qualitative evidence to 
supplement our quantitative analyses and corroborate our theory. Our interviews confirm that 
product line manager indeed have incentives to rent-seek. Given that they have basically no 
influence on their sales targets, the only way to make targets easier is to get allocated more 
resources in terms of marketing budget to try to boost sales. Thus, product line managers have 
incentives to lobby for excess resources, especially when sales targets are more difficult to achieve 
(i.e., weaker entities). It is also worth mentioning that the product line’s bottom line is typically 
not taken into account in performance evaluations and promotion decisions, which implies that 
product line managers are not bearing the consequences of higher marketing budgets allocated to 
them. Further, our interviews reveal that managers with higher marketing budgets are considered 
more important, and being assigned a bigger product line is even considered as some sort of 
informal promotion. This gives product line managers incentives for empire building.  
Our interviews describe the budget reallocation process as a “balancing act” between the 
product line portfolio’s market-share, net sales and profit performance. In order to achieve the 
“best balance” across product lines, the initial budget allocation gets “updated”. Our interviews 
additionally reveal that the most important trigger for budget boosts is the reaction to unexpected 
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competitors’ activities, as these most directly influence market share (which is considered the most 
important KPI). Information about such activities is not available ex ante and adjustments to the 
budget therefore take place over the course of the business year in order to keep up with 
competitors.  
Regarding the decisions on whom to cut to free up the needed resources, the first thing that the 
management committee mentions is changes to a product line’s profitability, which mostly is 
driven by the ratio of sales-to-date performance to marketing costs. With marketing cost being the 
most important line item, underperforming in sales directly translates into underperforming in 
profits, if marketing cost is kept unadjusted. Thus, if profitability drops, marketing budget is 
shifted away from the concerned product lines in order to safeguard the targeted bottom line. Our 
interviews also confirm that the initial budget allocation is indeed taken into account in the decision 
of whom to cut. In particular, product lines that, in hindsight, got “too much” budget, will be cut 
to restore the balance as described above. When asked to describe how “too much” budget is 
defined, two things are mentioned, in order of importance: (1) too much budget as compared to 
realized sales-to-date performance and (2) too much budget as compared to the realization of 
expected external forces (such as expected competitor actions or changes to customer preferences), 
both of which are in line with our theory underlying H2a and H2b.  
While product line managers are heavily involved in the initial budget allocation process, 
reallocation decisions are typically made by the management committee, in cooperation with the 
controlling department. Most importantly, while product line managers might approach the 
management committee for extra resources once new information about competitor activities 
comes up, product line managers are typically not involved in the decisions on whom to cut to free 
up the needed resources. Thus, it is safe to say that the reallocation process is much less affected 
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by politicking behavior than the initial budget allocation process, consistent with the premise 
underlying hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
Sample, data and measures 
The data cover the period from 2007 to 2010, resulting in 122 product line-year observations for 
the four-year time period. For each individual product line, we gathered budget as well as actual 
data for the following variables: net sales (less returns), contribution margin, and total marketing 
expenditure. Moreover, we received actual data on market shares and quarterly net sales for the 
period of 2006 until 2010. Further, the marketing director rated the degree of competition per 
product line, resulting in an indicator variable for high versus low competition. We also collected 
data on launches within a product line or launches of entirely new product lines occurring during 
each year. Further, based on historical sales growth and a subjective classification by the marketing 
director with respect to each product line’s stage in the product life cycle, we classify each product 
as a being in the growth vs. maturity stage.  
4. Empirical design 
Marketing budget allocation: The near-optimal allocation rule 
Given that ConsumerCo has a fixed marketing budget that needs to be allocated among all product 
lines within the division, we need an allocation rule that determines the optimal share of the 
marketing budget per product line. Fischer et al. (2011) develop an allocation method that 
optimally allocates a fixed marketing budget among products in a diverse product portfolio. The 
optimal allocation rule in this case is the allocation rule that maximizes the discounted total profits 
of the portfolio. More importantly, Fischer et al. (2011) develop a near-optimal allocation rule that 
is easy to implement and for which they show, using a simulation, that it converges to the optimal 
solution under varying conditions. Given that the context of a fixed marketing budget and a diverse 
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product portfolio used by Fischer et al. (2011) fits with our empirical setting, we follow their 
approach to determine the near-optimal shares of the marketing budget. The near-optimal 
allocation rule incorporates information about: (1) the size of the product line, (2) the contribution 
margin, (3) the (long-term) effectivenes of marketing investments, (4) the growth potential, and 
(5) the time value of money. In order to ensure the validity of using the allocation model at our 
research site, an interview with the head of controlling was conducted to gain insights regarding 
the factors considered in their initial marketing budget allocation decisions. Consistent with the 
allocation model, the most important factor taken into account during the budgeting process is the 
planned sales. When allocating the capital to the different product lines, the percentage of 
marketing investment relative to sales plays a key role. Further, most other factors covered by the 
allocation model, such as growth opportunities, contribution margin, and sales elasticities were 
mentioned as important input factors. A full description of the allocation rule as well as the 
specifics of applying it to our setting are reported in the Online Appendix. 
Measures of budget misallocation and reallocation 
We use the near-optimal share of the marketing budget to develop variables associated with the 
over- or under-allocation of the initial marketing budget induced by other factors not included in, 
and consequently, not explained by the economic optimal solution. Specifically, we use the 
difference between the budgeted share of total marketing expenditure of product line i of product-
category k at time t minus the near-optimal share of product line i of product-category k at time t 
as a proxy for the misallocated marketing budget at the product line level in a given year 
(MISALLOCATIONikt).
9 Second, we separate the over-allocation of marketing expenditurs from 
                                                 
9 These deviations from the optimal allocation are unlikely to be driven by experimentation, in the sense that it is 
optimal to take actions that do not maximize short-term expected profit to produce information about the firm’s profit 
drivers (Dye 2004). In the marketing-intensive firm that we examine, there is no uncertainty about whether marketing 
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the under-allocation by creating two variables based on MISALLOCATIONikt. 
%OVERALLOCATIONikt (%UNDERALLOCATIONikt) equals MISALLOCATIONikt (-
1*MISALLOCATIONikt) if MISALLOCATIONikt is positive (negative) and zero otherwise.  
Furthermore, during the business year, new information on profitability and growth 
opportunities of the product lines may become available. As a consequence, reallocations in the 
budget and, therefore, of marketing investment may occur. While MISALLOCATIONikt represents 
the impact of other factors (than those included in the near-optimal solution) on ex ante budget 
allocation decisions, %REALLOCATIONikt reflects reallocation decisions ex post. Whenever the 
actual allocation of marketing expenditures at year-end and the initially budgeted allocation differ, 
new information that arises throughout the year has induced managers to reconsider their 
investment decisions and reallocate resources during the year. If actual expenditures exceed the 
budget, a larger share than initially budgeted has been allocated to a product line during the year, 
thus, there is an ex post budget share boost. In the opposite case, the budget share of the respective 
product line has been cut during the year and the resources have been allocated to another product 
line.10 Consistent with the variables for ex ante misallocation, we measure %REALLOCATIONikt 
as the difference between the actual and budgeted share of marketing expenditures received. We 
further define IND_SHARECUTikt as an indicator variable set equal to one for observations for 
which %REALLOCATIONikt is negative, indicating a budget share cut.  
                                                 
expenditures are a profit driver; they are crucial. In addition, any experimentation cannot explain the results in this 
paper. 
10 Note that in measuring REALLOCATION we focus on comparing the actual ex-post share of actual marketing 
expenditures to the ex-ante share of the budgeted marketing expenditures. From an efficiency perspective, the 
conceptually correct variable to measure reallocations is the change in the share relative to the other product lines. 
That is, efficiency is about how the resources are allocated. Thus, our focus in the theory development and the analysis 
of H2 is on the share of the pie that a product line had initially versus the share it has after the reallocation, as the goal 
is the most efficient exploitation of investment opportunities at the firm level, thus the budget of one product line 
relative to the other product lines matters. From an efficiency point of view, which is our focus, it does not matter 
whether the pie changes. 
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5. Results 
Descriptives 
The descriptive statistics, presented in Table 1, show the following noteworthy results. The 
budgeted share of the marketing budget (BUDGETSHARE) that a product line on average gets, is 
3.25%, while the maximum share is less than 20%, which indicates that there is not a single product 
line that dominates the budget allocation. A similar pattern is observed for the near-optimal share, 
with an average of 3.28% and a maximum of less than 26%. Furthermore, 38.52% of the product 
line-year observations contains over-allocations, which indicates that, although under-allocations 
are more likely, over-allocations are larger when they occur.11 The reallocations during the year 
range from a share cut of 2.31% to a share boost of 5.22%, which is significant given the average 
share of the marketing budget allocated to product lines. Moreover, none of the correlations 
between the independent variables used in our analysis (untabulated) cause multicollinearity 
concerns. 
Initial analysis of misallocations 
In section 2, we provided a number of reasons for why the share of the marketing budget allocated 
to a product line might deviate from the economic optimal solution. In particular, there could be 
random error due to information asymmetry, there could be a cognitive bias in favor of naïve 
diversification, and/or there could be rent-seeking. First, we examine whether naïve diversification 
drives budget allocation decisions in our setting. An allocation based on naïve diversification 
implies a cognitive bias towards spreading resources over all product lines more evenly than would 
be dictated by the optimal allocation of resources, i.e., a bias towards an allocation that equals 1/n, 
with n being the number of product lines (Bardolet et al. 2011). Under the assumption that an 
                                                 
11 This conclusion follows from the fact that the misallocations sum up to zero and are thus on average zero. 
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unbiased allocation should take the relative size of a product line into account in the allocation 
decision (Bardolet et al. 2011), in the sense that larger lines should get a larger share, a bias towards 
an allocation that equals 1/n automatically implies that larger lines are at a disadvantage. As a 
result, if an allocation based on naïve diversification is at play, then the allocation is positively 
related to 1/n and, conditional on this, negatively related to the relative size of the product line. 
We closely follow Bardolet et al. (2011) and estimate Model (1) to test whether naïve 
diversification is driving the allocation of the marketing budget in our setting (see the Online 
Appendix for a formal derivation of this equation). For naïve diversification to be present, a 
necessary condition is that 𝛽2 > 0. If the relative size argument also holds, then the additional 
condition is that 𝛽3 < 0. 
 𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐴𝐿𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸_𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸_𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝜇 (M1) 
where OPTIMALWEIGHT is the near-optimal share, SHARE_EQUAL is 1 𝑛⁄ , and SHARE_SIZE 
is the product line’s sales in year t over the sum of all product lines’ sales in year t. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of estimating Model (1), once without including the 
relative size of the product line and once with including it. We find that, while the near-optimal 
share (OPTIMALWEIGHT) is positive and significant in both regressions, as expected, the variable 
SHARE_EQUAL is not significant in both regressions. We thus fail to find evidence in favor of 
the necessary condition for the presence of naïve diversification. In addition, the coefficient on 
SHARE_SIZE is positive and significant, which is contrary to the expectation of naïve 
diversification via relative size. In sum, we find no evidence that the allocation of the marketing 
budget is being driven by naïve diversification, which allows us to rule out that the results of our 
upcoming analyses are driven by naïve diversification. 
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Rulling out naïve diversification does not, however, imply that rent-seeking is at play. To 
examine whether there is some initial evidence for the presence of rent-seeking, we focus on the 
rent-seeking prediction that cross-subsidization is systematically related to “productivity”. In 
particular, theory predicts that rent-seeking occurs for “weak” product lines, i.e., lines with 
productivity below some threshold, leading to an over-allocation, while product lines above the 
threshold (“strong”) are used to cross-subsidize and are thus under-allocated. We therefore 
examine how misallocations are distributed over different levels of productivity. To create these 
subgroups of productivity, we exploit the fact that the theory of optimal allocation predicts that, 
all else equal, more productive product lines should get allocated a greater share of the pool of 
resources. For example, all else equal, product lines with a greater marketing effectiveness should 
receive a greater share. Similarly, all else equal, product lines with a greater growth potential 
should receive a greater share. Given that all these productivity components monotonically 
increase the near-optimal share, it follows that subgroups based on our measure of the near-optimal 
share by construction overlap with subgroups based on (unobserved) productivity.12 As a result, 
we split the near-optimal share in quintiles and examine the average misallocation of each quintile. 
The results, presented in Panel B of Table 2, first of all show that misallocations increase from the 
first to the third quintile and drop afterwards. Second, the average misallocation is positive in 
quintiles 1-4 and negative in quintile 5, which implies that there is on average an over-allocation 
in quintiles 1-4 and an under-allocation in quintile 5. Third, the over-allocation is (marginally) 
significantly different from zero in quintile 2 and 3 (p=0.11 and p=0.02 two-tailed, respectively), 
while the under-allocation in quintile 5 is marginally significantly different from zero (p=0.19 two-
                                                 
12 See the Online Appendix for a formal derivation. 
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tailed). Finally, while the average misallocation is not significantly different among the first four 
quintiles, all first four quintiles are significantly different from quintile 5.13 
Overall these results show that the pattern of misallocations is not random.14 More importantly, 
while the pattern does not provide evidence of rent-seeking per se, the pattern is consistent with 
the rent-seeking prediction that misallocations are a function of productivity. The highest quintile 
is clearly distinct from the rest and, if the rent-seeking story holds, most likely represents the 
absence of rent-seeking, i.e., those product lines that are used for cross-subsidization purposes. We 
use this observation to create an indicator variable for “high productivity”, which allows for more 
specific tests of our rent-seeking hypotheses. 
Misallocation and rent-seeking behavior of weaker divisions (H1a and H1b) 
H1 predicts that budget misallocations regarding the initial budget are associated with subsequent 
year-to-date performance. We test H1 with the following OLS models:  
 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝜈𝑖𝑘𝑡  (M2) 
where [DV] is Q1_PERF_YTD, Q2_PERF_YTD, or Q3_PERF_YTD, representing year-to-date 
performance regarding sales after each of the first three quarters.15 That is, for each quarter, we 
                                                 
13 Note that the pattern we show in Panel B of Table 2 is inconsistent with more productive managers being more 
powerful and systematically using this power to not settle for an underallocation. 
14 While the pattern in Panel B of Table 2 shows a non-random error, this does not imply that random error is 
completely absent. What is important for our upcoming analysis is that any misallocation that is driven by random 
error cannot explain Hypothesis 1a. 
15  The timing of the measurement of year-to-date performance is based on interviews with the Head of Controlling, 
indicating that most reallocations are conducted in the second half of the year, and preferably the latest after the 3rd 
quarter to allow the reallocations to still have an effect on the performance in the current year. Therefore, only the first 
three quarters allow for a clean test of H1.  
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compare the sales-to-date to the sales plan to date and measure percentage differences. 16 , 17 
Consistent with H1, we argue that, on average, over-allocations are negatively associated with 
year-to-date performance (𝛽1 < 0), while we have no directional prediction for under-allocations 
(𝛽2). In all models, we control for the product line’s stage in the product life cycle (LCYCLE), 
equaling 1 when a product line is in the growth stage, and 0 when it is in the maturity stage. We 
add another indicator variable accounting for the impact of a launch within a product line. 
LAUNCH equals 1 in the case of at least one launch in the product line at time t, and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, a launch may not only represent one new product added to an existing product line, but 
a launch of a whole new product line. To account for this, we include an indicator variable for the 
launch of a new product line. NEWPL equals 1 if a new product line is launched in a product 
category, and 0 otherwise. We further control for the natural log of the lagged market share of the 
product line (lnLMSHARE) and the degree of competition in the market for the product line, where 
COMP equals 1 if the degree of competition in the product line’s market is high and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we include B_CM%, which is the budgeted contribution margin percentage of the product 
line. We furthermore include year fixed effects, product-category fixed effects, and cluster the 
standard errors by product line. 
The results are reported in Table 3. Consistent with our expectation, we find evidence that 
initially over-allocated products are less likely to achieve their sales targets. In particular, 𝛽1 is 
negative and significant in all models. Most importantly, initially over-allocated products already 
                                                 
16 While market share is an important measure of marketing performance for the firm, we focus on sales-to-date 
performance for the following reasons. First, our interviews confirmed that sales-to-date performance on product line 
level is the most important performance measure that is closely monitored during the year, and also formally reported 
each quarter. Second, and more importantly, we do not have quarterly data on market share, thus it is not even possible 
to test H1 with this measure, as the annual change in market share is always affected by reallocations, and thus not a 
clean measure of performance subsequent to the initial budget allocation. 
17 In measuring sales plan to date, we create quarterly sales plans by dividing the annual sales plan equally over the 
year. The equal divide seems reasonable in the empirical setting that we examine and an additional seasonality test 
confirms this. 
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perform worse after the first quarter. Taken together, these findings suggest that indeed weaker 
entities are more likely to be over-allocated, and not able to exploit their resource advantage, 
providing evidence in favor of H1a. 18  Regarding under-allocation, 𝛽2  is also significantly 
negative. This implies that under-allocated entities are, on average, not able to outperform their 
target due to being disadvantaged from a resource allocation perspective.  
To provide more evidence in favor of the rent-seeking argument, we create an indicator variable 
based on the grouping of productivity that reflects the propensity of rent-seeking behavior. Based 
on the results in Panel B of Table 2, we create the indicator variable H_PROD that equals 1 if the 
near-optimal share of the marketing budget of a product line is in quintile 5, and zero otherwise. 
As discussed before, if the rent-seeking story holds, then this highest quintile most likely represents 
the absence of rent-seeking. If rent-seeking behavior of weaker entities is indeed present, we expect 
that the impact of %OVERALLOCATION on year-to-date performance is more negative for 
H_PROD=0 as compared to H_PROD=1. This is because an over-allocation of a high-productivity 
product line is more likely to be driven by random allocations errors, and therefore expected to 
negatively affect sales performance to a lesser extent, if at all. In addition, in developing H1b, we 
stated that there can be two off-setting effects of an under-allocation. On the one hand, the under-
allocation creates a resource disadvantage that hurts performance, while on the other hand, if this 
under-allocation occurs for stronger entities, they might be productive enough to counteract this 
resource disadvantage, resulting in a smaller decrease of performance, or even no decrease at all. 
We thus also expect that the impact of %UNDERALLOCATION on year-to-date performance is 
more negative for H_PROD=0 as compared to H_PROD=1. The following model allows us to 
specifically test these expectations: 
                                                 
18 Again note that we have ruled out that naïve diversification plays a role in the allocation process in our setting and 
that random errors cannot explain lower performance. 
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𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡
+ 𝛽3%𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑥𝐻_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑡  
+𝛽4%𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑘𝑡𝑥𝐻_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑡  
+𝛽5𝐻_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑘𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝜈𝑖𝑘𝑡 
(M3) 
We find evidence consistent with our rent-seeking expectations, as shown in Table 4. More 
specifically, we find that 𝛽1 , which is the coefficient for product lines where H_PROD=0, is 
negative and significant in all three quarters. Most importantly, we find that the interaction 
coefficient 𝛽3 is significantly positive in all three quarters, which implies that the negative impact 
of %OVERALLOCATION on year-to-date performance is significantly smaller for product lines 
where H_PROD=1. The sum of the coefficients of 𝛽1  and 𝛽3,  which reflects the impact of 
%OVERALLOCATION for product lines where H_PROD=1, is not significantly different from 
zero. 
Regarding %UNDERALLOCATION we find a similar pattern. That is, we find that 𝛽2 is 
negative and significant in all three quarters, while the interaction coefficient 𝛽4is significantly 
positive. These results imply that under-allocation hurts performance for weak entities but less so 
for stronger ones. Regarding the latter we find that the sum of the coefficients of 𝛽2 and 𝛽4 is not 
significantly different from zero, which implies that under-allocation does not hurt performance 
for strong product lines. 
In sum, the evidence provided in Tables 3 and 4 provides support for H1a, as well as the 
arguments underlying the development of H1b. In particular, we provide strong evidence 
consistent with rent-seeking being an important driver of misallocations of the marketing budget. 
Determinants of budget reallocations (H2a and H2b) 
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H2a and H2b are concerned with the determinants of budget reallocations. H2a and H2b predict 
that misallocation regarding the initial budget drives subsequent reallocation decisions 
(IND_SHARECUT or %REALLOCATION). In particular, we expect that over-allocated product 
lines are more likely to be cut, while the opposite holds for initially under-allocated product lines. 
To test these predictions, we estimate the determinants of budget reallocations by using Model 
(M2) defined before, but where the [DV] is IND_SHARECUTikt or %REALLOCATIONikt. For 
IND_SHARECUT, we estimate the equations with a probit estimation, while we use OLS 
regressions if the dependent variable is %REALLOCATION. 
In addition to the control variables used before, we further control for Q3_PERF_YTD in 
explaining budget reallocation decisions. An important way through which uncertainty regarding 
the stated investment opportunities is resolved is through observing realized sales performance, 
which might reveal potential overallocations in the initial budgeting process that, as we expect, 
will be taken into account in reallocation decisions. Thus, observed sales-to-date performance is 
an important trigger of reallocations, irrespective of the initial budget allocation process.  
Controlling for the performance development during the year allows us to isolate the direct effect 
of initial misallocations on reallocation decisions, over and above its effect through realized sales 
performance. For similar reasons we also replace the budgeted contribution margin by the 
difference between the actual and budgeted contribution margin (CH_CM%). 
The results are reported in Table 5, where Column (1) reports the results for the indicator 
variable IND_SHARECUT as the dependent variable, and Column (2) for the continuous variable 
%REALLOCATION. The results regarding IND_SHARECUT provide evidence that product lines 
that were allocated a larger share of the marketing budget than the near-optimal share are more 
likely to be cut during the year (𝛽1 > 0). Surprisingly, we find that the adjustment process is 
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asymmetric, because initially under-allocated products are, on average, not less likely to be cut (𝛽2 
is not significant in explaining IND_SHARECUT). We observe a similar pattern of results in 
Column (2) of Table 5. That is, %OVERALLOCATION is significantly negatively associated with 
%REALLOCATION, while %UNDERALLOCATION is not associated with %REALLOCATION. 
This implies that not only the likelihood of being cut is associated with the extent to which a 
product line is over-allocated, but also the size of the cut. Lastly, both models show that the 
likelihood and magnitude of budget share cuts increase with decreasing Q3_PERF_YTD and 
CH_CM%, consistent with performance developments being associated with reallocation 
decisions.  
To provide more evidence in favor of the rent-seeking argument, we again examine whether 
the productivity of a product line affects the relation between initial misallocations and subsequent 
budget reallocations. Specifically, we run Model (M3) with IND_SHARECUT or 
%REALLOCATION as the dependent variable and Q3_PERF_YTD and CH_CM% as additional 
control variables. The results for IND_SHARECUT, presented in Column (1) of Table 6, show a 
pattern consistent with initial rent-seeking behavior playing a role in budget reallocation decisions. 
More specifically, we find that 𝛽1 is significantly positive and 𝛽3 is significantly negative. This 
implies that, for less productive product lines, which are most likely to rent-seek, the likelihood of 
a budget share cut is higher the higher the over-allocation, while this effect is significantly less 
present for more productive product lines, which are least likely to rent-seek. The sum of the 
coefficients of 𝛽1 and 𝛽3, which reflects the impact of %OVERALLOCATION for product lines 
where H_PROD=1, is not significantly different from zero. That is, high productive product lines 
that are over-allocated are not more likely to be cut, consistent with these over-allocations being 
most likely driven by random errors that are least likely to be penalized.  
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Regarding under-allocations and IND_SHARECUT, we find that 𝛽2, which is the coefficient for 
product lines where H_PROD=0, is not significant, while the interaction coefficient 𝛽4  is 
significantly negatively. We additionally find that the sum of the coefficients of 𝛽2 and 𝛽4, which 
captures the effect for product lines where H_PROD=1, is significantly negative. These results 
imply that, for less productive product lines, being under-allocated does not lower the likelihood 
of being cut, while for more productive product lines, being under-allocated does lower the 
likelihood of being cut. These findings are in line with reallocation decisions taking into account 
the initial allocation decision and especially the underlying rent-seeking behavior; over-allocated 
rent-seekers are more likely to be cut, while under-allocated “cross-subsidizers” are less likely to 
be cut. The results in Column (2) of Table 6 regarding the size of the reallocation, i.e., 
%REALLOCATION, do not show any significant interaction effects. 
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 confirm that managers indeed take the initial budget 
allocation into account when deciding on budget reallocations during the year, over and above the 
changes in expectations with respect to sales and profit performance. In particular, we find strong 
evidence for H2a, as initial over-allocation is, on average, associated with subsequent budget share 
cuts, and significantly more so for less productive product lines, which are most likely to rent-
seek. While we do not find an average effect of under-allocation on budget share cuts, we do show 
that under-allocation lowers the probability of a budget share cut for more productive product 
lines, which provides evidence for the argumentation underlying H2b.    
Performance consequences of budget reallocations (H3) 
The ultimate reason why firms redistribute the initially allocated budget is their assumption that 
such reallocations increase performance of the entities that receive an additional share of the 
capital, and/ or mitigate the losses of entities by managing profits via cuts in the share of expenses. 
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However, it is an open empirical question if and in which direction budget reallocations affect 
performance. To shed light on this issue, we perform an exploratory analysis to investigate the 
consequences of budget reallocations for two different types of performance measures, i.e., the 
annual change in market share as an externally-oriented measure of market-place performance and 
sales performance in the final quarter as an internally-oriented measure of sales plan 
achievement.19 In particular, we estimate the following model: 
 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝐶𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑘𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1
+ 𝜈𝑖𝑘𝑡  (M4) 
where [DV] is the annual change in market share (CH_MSHARE) or sales performance in the final 
quarter (Q4_SALESPERF). We measure CH_MSHARE as the percentage point change in market 
share from the previous to the current year. Q4_SALESPERF is measured as the percentage 
deviation of the realized sales from the planned sales in the last quarter, before the start of which 
all reallocations have taken place. Our main independent variables %BOOST and %CUT capture 
the budget reallocations, each of which we measure in two different ways. From an efficiency 
perspective, the conceptually correct variable to measure reallocations is the change in the budget 
share relative to the other product lines, as captured by the previously defined variable 
%REALLOCATION. We then separate budget share boosts from budget share cuts by creating two 
variables based on %REALLOCATION. %SHAREBOOST (%SHARECUT) equals 
%REALLOCATION (-1*%REALLOCATION) if %REALLOCATION is positive (negative) and 
zero otherwise. 
                                                 
19 While there are no explicit targets related to market share on product line level, it is considered the company’s most 
important KPI, which at all levels of aggregation is closely monitored by headquarters as well as division management. 
Further, we focus on sales performance in the 4th quarter, as reallocations are typically conducted in the second half 
of the year, but no later than the end of the 3rd quarter, to ensure that the reallocations still can have an effect in the 
same year. In fact, one of the most important objectives of the firm is making sure that sales performance (which is 
considered sell-in performance) indeed translates into sell-out performance, that is, market share. 
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In the case of the total budgeted marketing expenses equaling the total actual spending level, 
changes to a product line’s budget share directly translate into the corresponding changes to the 
product line’s budget level (in monetary terms), given that the “pie” remains constant, i.e.,  
reallocations are a zero-sum-game. However, at our research site, the total actual spending level 
ex post often differs from the total budget level ex ante, which per definition changes the total pie 
to be allocated. Thus, either extra resources might become available for allocation during the year 
or the marketing expenditures allocated to ConsumerCo ex ante is reduced.20 Thus, changes to the 
budget share do not necessarily move in the same direction as changes to the actual budget levels 
of the product lines. To capture the separate effect of actual changes to the budget level, we create 
separate variables capturing the degree to which product lines actually are cut or receive additional 
money. We measure %LEVELCHANGE as the realized marketing expenditures (in €) minus the 
budgeted marketing expenditures (in €), scaled by the budget. As with the budget share 
reallocations, we then separate budget boosts from budget cuts by creating two variables based on 
%LEVELCHANGE. %LEVELBOOST (%LEVELCUT) equals %LEVELCHANGE (-
1*%LEVELCHANGE) if %LEVELCHANGE is positive (negative) and zero otherwise.  
Besides the control variables used in the previous models, we also add the indicator variable 
TV assuming the value of 1 when the product line is advertised via TV commercials and zero 
                                                 
20 Several conditions can cause this change in the total spending level ex-post. ConsumerCo has a corporate account 
which carries the budget for any activities that cannot be attributed to an individual product line. If extra resources are 
available from this corporate account, it can be allocated to the other product lines in order to enhance their 
performance. Further, in rare cases MotherCo allocates extra resources to be spent on marketing of ConsumerCo. Such 
extra resources are made available, for instance, when a competitor (unexpectedly) launches a new product to the 
market and a fast response is required. Since such competitive action may not have been accounted for in the initial 
budget, MotherCo may decide to invest extra resources to counter competition. Yet, in such case MotherCo also 
prescribes how the resources are to be employed. Lastly, if the bottom line of ConsumerCo does not develop as desired, 
MotherCo may also decide to cut the resources allocated to ConsumerCo in order to safeguard its profits. In such a 
case, the managing director of ConsumerCo and the controlling department need to decide which product lines’ 
budgets will be reduced. As a result, the total spending level ex-post is lower than the budgeted level ex-ante. 
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otherwise, given its broader reach and potentially higher impact on market share. We control for 
year and product-category fixed effects and cluster the standard errors by product line. 
The results are reported in Table 7. Before discussing the results, it is important to note that 
virtually all share boosts go hand in hand with a level boost, while 10 percent of the level boosts 
do not increase the share (that is, additional money is proportionally distributed). In contrast, 
virtually all level cuts are at the same time also share cuts, while 14% of the share cuts are not 
accompanied by a direct cut in levels. Thus, in our setting %SHAREBOOST captures observations 
with simultaneous share and level boosts, while %LEVELCUT captures simultaneous level and 
share cuts. Given that the change in share and the change in level move in the same direction for 
these two variables, we expect the results for these two variables to be the strongest and most 
meaningful.  
In line with the firm’s intentions, a budget boost in terms of share and/or level during the year 
helps to reach internal sales plans in the last quarter. As can be expected, the combination of joint 
share and level boosts, in our case captured by the coefficient on %SHAREBOOST, has the bigger 
effect. However, neither of them affects the annual change in market share, the ultimate indicator 
of product line success. These results suggest that managers plan with the resources they initially 
are allocated, thus receiving more resources than expected does not make them use this money 
efficiently with respect to market-place performance compared to the competition. The fact that 
budget boosts do support sales plan achievement, but do not help in translating internal sales 
performance into external market-place performance is remarkable, given that the ultimate goal of 
reallocations is to optimize market share. It specifically implies that, to the extent that budget 
boosts are used to exploit emerging market opportunities, managers are unable to use the additional 
resources to outperform their competitors. Regarding budget cuts, %SHARECUT does not affect 
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any of the performance measures. More relevant, while %LEVELCUT (which in our case also 
corresponds to a share cut) is not associated with sales relative to plan, it is negatively associated 
with the annual change in market share. This implies that unexpected budget cuts during the year 
interfere with the marketing strategy the product line managers had worked out, implying that 
those that got cut are not able to stick to their plans, which in turn leads them to be outrun by their 
competitors. In sum, our results suggest that, while budget cuts and boosts do improve overall 
internal sales performance, they show an overall negative effect on external market-place 
performance. That is, as soon as competition is taken into account, and thus the emerging market 
opportunities that trigger a demand for reallocations, the reallocations fail their purpose. In an 
attempt to achieve a more efficient budget allocation via reallocations, managers distort operations 
even more, making such reallocations ex post inefficient. 
6. Conclusion 
We provide first insights into the determinants and consequences of budget reallocations. Budget 
reallocations might well be justified for a particular budget entity at hand as new and valuable 
information gets revealed during the period. However, an important point in that matter is that, 
given the scarcity of resources, changes to the budget of one entity typically require changes to the 
budget of another entity as well. We show that such reallocations are directly linked to the initial 
budgeting process, in the sense that misallocations regarding the initially allocated budget are 
associated with reallocations, with the aim to correct for these inefficiencies.21 Most importantly, 
we show that ultimately, these reallocations do not lead to performance improvements, suggesting 
that reallocations might not mitigate the effects of initial misallocations and might even make 
                                                 
21 Our analysis is built on the assumption that the measurement of the near-optimal allocation (and thus misallocation) 
sufficiently captures the “real” near-optimal allocation. As such, our hypothesis tests are joint tests of the hypotheses 
and the validity of the underlying measure. 
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things worse. While we show that initially over-allocated entities do get cut in the reallocation 
process, these corrective actions might come too late. In other words, in order to be efficient, 
reallocations would have to be done at the beginning of the budgeting period, implying that the 
best way to achieve high performance is to avoid misallocations in the first place. This emphasizes 
the value of budgeting and efficient investment planning, justifying the high amount of money and 
time firms put into the annual budgeting process. 
There are a number of features specific to our setting that are worth discussing, in light of the 
generalizability of our results. One important feature is that sales and profit plans for the business 
groups are set in a rather strict top-down manner. While such planning policies are not unusual, 
this design feature has two important implications.22 First, managers can, in general, lobby for 
numerous things, including easier performance targets (slack) and more resources. In our setting, 
sales managers have no opportunity to lobby for lower sales plans, which leaves lobbying for more 
resources, i.e., a higher marketing budget. Therefore, lobbying efforts in our setting are 
concentrated on the marketing budgeting allocation. While this “concentration” is surely not 
generalizable, what matters is that the allocation of resources is troubled by rent-seeking behavior, 
a finding that has also been shown in prior literature and is not specific to our setting. Under a 
more participative planning process, the incentives for rent-seeking behavior remain but things get 
more complicated because plans are a key determinant of budget allocations. That is, the 
measurement of the near-optimal share would be obscured by rent-seeking behavior in the 
planning process, which makes our empirical design less powerful in such a setting. Thus, the 
importance of the sales planning feature is that it allows us to test our theory in a rather clean 
setting. Second and relatedly, given the planning process, the relative difficulty of the plans is 
                                                 
22 In fact, around 50% of multi-divisional firms indicate to set business group targets in a rather top down way, most 
importantly due to the pressure of meeting or beating the corporate target (see Feichter et al. 2018). 
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higher for weaker entities. If over-allocation is associated with the weak versus strong entities, 
then over-allocation is also expected to be associated with sales performance compared to plans. 
In a setting where managers have the opportunity to influence their sales plans, we might not find 
an association between misallocations and subsequent sales performance, given that such plans 
could potentially reflect the relative strength of entities. This implies that, to test the underlying 
theory that relates to cross-subsidization, we merely use an empirical design choice that is specific 
to our setting. A final important feature of our setting is that product line managers do not have 
explicit targets related to product line profits, implying that they do not bear the (direct) cost of 
having a higher marketing budget. This also implies that the benefits of successful rent-seeking 
are relatively high, which makes our empirical setting a powerful setting for testing our theory. 
We acknowledge that under a different corporate planning process or an alternative incentive 
scheme for profit line managers, rent-seeking could be less beneficial. Clearly, if there is no rent-
seeking in the initial budget allocation process, then there is also no need to use the reallocation 
process to correct for such inefficiencies. Our results do not suggest otherwise. More importantly, 
it is safe to assume that not all information and agency problems are resolved by such alternative 
mechanisms and thus that (some) rent-seeking behavior will remain “in equilibrium” (Stein 2003, 
p. 113), i.e., in settings other than the one we examine. In sum, while some of our key empirical 
design choices are specific to our setting, our theoretical arguments and the inferences we draw 
based on our results are not. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description 
 BUDGETSHARE the total marketing budget of product line i divided by the 
sum of all marketing budgets of the division 
OPTIMALSHARE represents the near-optimal share of the marketing budget 
budget per product line 
MISALLOCATION excess marketing budget at the product line level in a given 
year, that is,  BUDGETSHARE - OPTIMALSHARE 
CAT_ PRODUCTIVITY is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5, representing the 
quintiles of OPTIMALSHARE 
%OVERALLOCATION  equals MISALLOCATION if MISALLOCATION is positive 
and zero otherwise 
%UNDERALLOCATION equals -1*MISALLOCATION if MISALLOCATION is 
negative and zero otherwise 
IND_OVERALLOCATION Indicator variable that equals 1 if MISALLOCATION is non-
zero, and 0 otherwise.  
%REALLOCATION  the difference in the budgeted and actual share of marketing 
capital received 
IND_SHARECUT an indicator variable that equals one if %REALLOCATION 
is negative, and zero otherwise 
PLANSLS The budget sales of product line i  
NPL the number of product lines at time t 
SHARE_EQUAL 1 over NPL, representing the expected share of the 
marketing budget if it was divided equally over all product 
lines 
SHARE_SIZE The lagged actual sales of product line i divided by the sum 
of lagged actual sales of the division, representing the 
relative size of the product line 
NEWPL Indicator variable that equals 1 if a new product line is 
launched, and 0 otherwise 
LCYCLE Indicator variable that equals 1 when a product line i is in 
the growth stage, and 0 when it is in the maturity stage. 
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B_CM Total budgeted contribution margin per product line i, 
exclusive marketing cost in Euros 
B_CM% Budgeted average contribution margin to sales ratio per 
product line i, exclusive marketing cost 
CH_CM% Difference between actual and budgeted average 
contribution margin to sales ratio per product line i, 
exclusive marketing cost 
COMP Indicator variable that equals 1 if the degree of competition 
in the product line’s market is high and 0 otherwise. 
LMARKSHARE The lagged market share per product line i 
LAUNCH Indicator variable that equals 1 in the case of at least one 
launch in the product line i in division j at time t this 
variable, and 0 otherwise. 
MARKSHARE The market share per product line i 
Q1_PERF_YTD Year-to-date performance after the 1st quarter in terms of 
sales target achievement, calculated as the realized sales 
after the 1st quarter minus the budgeted sales after the 1st 
quarter (extrapolated from the total budgeted sales), scaled 
by the budget 
Q2_PERF_YTD Year-to-date performance after the 2nd  quarter in terms of 
sales target achievement, calculated as the realized sales 
after the 2nd quarter minus the budgeted sales after the 2nd  
quarter (extrapolated from the total budgeted sales), scaled 
by the budget 
Q3_PERF_YTD Year-to-date performance after the 3rd quarter in terms of 
sales target achievement, calculated as the realized sales 
after the 3rd quarter minus the budgeted sales after the 3rd 
quarter (extrapolated from the total budgeted sales), scaled 
by the budget  
Q4_ PERF_YTD Year-to-date performance after the 4th quarter in terms of 
sales target achievement, calculated as the total annual 
realized sales minus the total budgeted annual sales, scaled 
by the budget  
CH_MSHARE The percentage point change in market share from the 
previous to the current year. 
Q4_SALESPERF the realized sales in the 4th quarter minus the budgeted sales 
in the 4th quarter (extrapolated from the total budgeted 
sales), scaled by the budget 
%SHAREBOOST equals %REALLOCATION if %REALLOCATION is 
positive and zero otherwise. 
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%SHARECUT equals -1*%REALLOCATION if %REALLOCATION is 
negative and zero otherwise. 
%LEVELCHANGE is the realized marketing expenditures (in €) minus the 
budgeted marketing expenditures (in €), scaled by the 
budget. 
%LEVELBOOST equals %LEVELCHANGE if %LEVELCHANGE is positive 
and zero otherwise 
%LEVELCUT equals -1* %LEVELCHANGE if %LEVELCHANGE is 
negative and zero otherwise 
TV Indicator variable that equals 1 if the product line is 
advertised via TV commercials and zero otherwise 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 n Mean sd Min Max 
BUDGETSHARE 122 0.0325 0.0467 0 0.1993 
OPTIMALSHARE 122 0.0328 0.0489 0 0.2572 
IND_OVERALLOCATION 122 0.3852 0.4887 0 1 
%OVERALLOCATION 122 0.0075 0.0145 0 0.0638 
%UNDERALLOCATION 122 0.0078 0.0165 0 0.0802 
IND_SHARECUT 122 0.4098 0.4938 0 1 
%REALLOCATION 122 0.0003 0.0090 -0.0231 0.0522 
NPL 122 30 3 26 34 
SHARE_EQUAL 122 0.0340 0.0033 0.0294 0.0385 
SHARE_SIZE 122 0.0328 0.0461 0 0.2081 
NEWPL 122 0.0738 0.2625 0 1 
LCYCLE 122 0.1885 0.3927 0 1 
B_CM% 122 0.4687 0.2478 0 0.7410 
CH_CM% 122 0.0908 0.2303 -0.2344 0.8976 
COMP 122 0.6721 0.4714 0 1 
LMARKSHARE 122 0.0422 0.0681 0 0.2511 
LAUNCH 122 0.4016 0.4923 0 1 
Q1_PERF_YTD 122 0.2468 0.9151 -1 5.7110 
Q2_PERF_YTD 122 0.2089 0.8145 -1 4.9302 
Q3_PERF_YTD 122 0.1617 0.7587 -1 4.9744 
Q4_PERF_YTD 122 0.0994 0.7549 -1 4.6781 
CH_MSHARE 122 0.0009 0.0095 -0.0361 0.0651 
Q4_SALESPERF 122 -0.0493 0.9473 -5.296 4.824 
%SHAREBOOST 122 0.0028 0.0065 0 0.0522 
%SHARECUT 122 0.0025 0.0049 0 0.0231 
%LEVELBOOST 122 0.4512 0.7321 0 3.5087 
%LEVELCUT 122 0.0989 0.2062 0 -1 
TV 122 0.4936 0.5018 0 1 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
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TABLE 2 
Pattern of budget misallocation 
PANEL A: Budget allocation and naïve diversification 
Variable Pred. sign BUDGETSHARE BUDGETSHARE 
 
    
 
Intercept 
 
 -0.013 
[0.014] 
0.008 
[0.021] 
 
OPTIMALSHARE  0.878*** 
[0.098] 
0.664*** 
[0.119] 
SHARE_EQUAL (+) 
 
0.387 
[0.410] 
0.347 
[0.417] 
SHARE_SIZE (-) 
  
0.286* 
[0.166] 
     
Product-category fixed effects  yes yes 
    
R2   0.866 0.878 
n   122 122 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e.. ‘(+)’ 
or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise. 
Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
PANEL B: Average misallocation per productivity category 
 
 
CAT_ PRODUCTIVITY 
 1 2 3 4 5a 
MISALLOCATION 0.14% 0.33% 0.56% 0.02% -1.19% 
aOnly category 5 is significantly different from all other categories 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
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TABLE 3 
Effect of budget misallocation on sales performance 
  (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Q1_PERF
_YTD 
Q2_PERF 
_YTD 
Q3_PERF 
_YTD  
Intercept  0.801 0.580 0.786  
  [0.753] [0.674] [0.723]  
%OVERALLOCATION  (-) -12.450** -12.968*** -11.320**  
  [6.336] [5.222] [5.126]  
%UNDERALLOCATION   -17.323** -15.327** -12.325*  
  [7.871] [7.078] [7.061]  
NEWPL  -0.677** -0.423 -0.371  
  [0.326] [0.270] [0.289]  
LCYCLE  -0.085 -0.098 -0.040  
  [0.198] [0.179] [0.162]  
B_CM%  -2.375* -1.692 -1.532  
  [1.263] [1.150] [1.182]  
LMSHARE  8.471*** 6.951*** 5.116**  
  [2.390] [2.039] [2.164]  
LAUNCH  -0.439** -0.339** -0.313**  
  [0.189] [0.155] [0.142]  
COMP  0.239 0.254 0.207  
  [0.199] [0.160] [0.155]  
      
Year fixed effects  yes yes yes  
Product-category fixed effects yes yes yes  
      
R-squared  0.282 0.229 0.195  
N  122 122 122  
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e.. ‘(+)’ 
or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise. 
Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
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TABLE 4 
Effect of budget misallocation on sales performance for high productivity product lines 
  (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES 
 
Pred. 
sign 
Q1_PERF
_YTD 
Q2_PERF 
_YTD 
Q3_PERF 
_YTD  
Intercept  0.864 0.602 0.837  
  [0.809] [0.735] [0.796]  
%OVERALLOCATION  (-) -15.459** -15.858** -14.562**  
  [7.924] [6.933] [6.856]  
H_PROD * %OVER (+) 12.812* 12.688* 11.842*  
  [9.712] [8.093] [7.230]  
%UNDER ALLOCATION (-) -28.782** -23.342** -19.089*  
  [15.301] [13.164] [12.716]  
H_PROD * %UNDER (+) 20.126* 16.654* 13.325*  
  [12.162] [10.309] [9.418]  
H_PROD  -0.421 -0.454* -0.328  
  [0.286] [0.242] [0.205]  
NEWPL  -0.731** -0.485 -0.409  
  [0.351] [0.298] [0.313]  
LCYCLE  -0.047 -0.056 -0.007  
  [0.198] [0.175] [0.160]  
B_CM%  -2.347* -1.649 -1.519  
  [1.271] [1.168] [1.200]  
LMSHARE  8.199*** 6.808*** 4.804**  
  [1.969] [1.690] [1.989]  
LAUNCH  -0.445** -0.327** -0.309**  
  [0.197] [0.158] [0.147]  
COMP  0.243 0.275* 0.231  
  [0.192] [0.162] [0.154]  
      
Year fixed effects  yes yes yes  
Product-category fixed effects yes yes yes  
      
R-squared  0.297 0.244 0.207  
N  122 122 122  
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e.. ‘(+)’ 
or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise. 
Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of budget reallocations  
   (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES 
 
Pred. sign  
 
IND_SHARE
CUT 
Pred. sign  
 
%REALLO 
CATION 
Intercept  -3.269***  0.007 
  [1.244]  [0.008] 
%OVERALLOCATION  (+) 37.622*** (-) -0.235** 
  [16.150]  [0.119] 
%UNDERALLOCATION  (-) -5.277 (+) -0.021 
  [10.808]  [0.047] 
Q3_PERF_YTD  -2.879***  0.002** 
  [0.702]  [0.001] 
NEWPL  -1.132  0.004 
  [0.722]  [0.004] 
LCYCLE  -0.751  0.008*** 
  [0.482]  [0.003] 
CH_CM%  -2.373***  0.006*** 
  [0.521]  [0.002] 
LMSHARE  8.513*  0.014 
  [4.877]  [0.024] 
LAUNCH  0.382  0.001 
  [0.320]  [0.002] 
COMP  0.028  -0.001 
  [0.411]  [0.005] 
     
Year fixed effects  Yes  yes 
Product-category fixed effects  Yes  yes 
     
Pseudo R-squared  0.394  0.255 
N  122  122 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e.. ‘(+)’ 
or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise. 
Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
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TABLE 6 
Determinants of budget reallocations for high productivity product lines  
   (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES 
 
Pred. sign  
 
IND_SHARE
CUT 
Pred. sign  
 
%REALLO 
CATION 
Intercept  -3.543***  0.006 
  [1.095]  [0.008] 
%OVERALLOCATION  (+) 47.022*** (-) -0.277** 
  [17.638]  [0.115] 
H_PROD * %OVER (-) -36.903** (+) 0.110 
  [19.530]  [0.213] 
%UNDERALLOCATION  (-) 17.019 (+) 0.079 
  [16.887]  [0.067] 
H_PROD * %UNDER (-) -37.680** (+) -0.076 
  [18.394]  [0.091] 
H_PROD  0.729  -0.002 
  [0.669]  [0.005] 
Q3_PERF_YTD  -2.998***  0.002** 
  [0.756]  [0.001] 
NEWPL  -1.078  0.003 
  [0.775]  [0.005] 
LCYCLE  -0.792  0.009*** 
  [0.505]  [0.003] 
CH_CM%  -2.075***  0.006*** 
  [0.559]  [0.002] 
LMSHARE  10.967**  0.012 
  [4.901]  [0.030] 
LAUNCH  0.415  0.002 
  [0.339]  [0.002] 
COMP  -0.081  0.000 
  [0.342]  [0.005] 
     
Year fixed effects  yes  yes 
Product-category fixed effects  yes  yes 
     
Pseudo R-squared  0.417  0.267 
N  122  122 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.10.  Indicated p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with predicted signs (i.e.. ‘(+)’ 
or ‘(-)’) and two-tailed otherwise. 
Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
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TABLE 7 
Performance effects of budget reallocations 
   (1)  (1)  (2)  (2) 
 
Variable   
CH_MSHA
RE 
 
CH_MSHA
RE  
Q4_SALESPE
RF   
Q4_SALESPE
RF 
  
Intercept   0.005  0.006  -0.262  0.221 
   [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.500]  [0.537] 
%SHAREBOOST   0.029    33.207**   
   [0.174]    [13.496]   
%LEVELBOOST     -0.000    0.696*** 
     [0.001]    [0.238] 
%SHARECUT   -0.181    -6.607   
   [0.218]    [10.713]   
%LEVELCUT     -0.006**    -1.302 
     [0.003]    [0.827] 
NEWPL   0.005  0.006*  -0.059  0.216 
   [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.422]  [0.458] 
LCYCLE   0.003  0.003  -0.049  0.010 
   [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.165]  [0.166] 
CH_CM%   0.005**  0.004*  -0.147  -0.422* 
   [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.354]  [0.237] 
LMSHARE   0.021  0.019  0.566  -0.187 
   [0.026]  [0.024]  [2.643]  [2.519] 
LAUNCH   -0.004  -0.005  -0.253*  -0.287** 
   [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.125]  [0.136] 
COMP   0.003  0.002  0.085  -0.081 
   [0.005]  [0.005]  [0.158]  [0.130] 
TV   -0.008*  -0.008**  0.167  -0.401* 
   [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.217]  [0.228] 
          
Year fixed effects   Yes  Yes  yes  yes 
Product-category fixed 
effects 
 
 Yes  Yes  yes 
 
yes 
          
R2   0.202  0.209  0.086  0.383 
n   122  122  122  122 
*** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.10, two-tailed. 
Standard errors in brackets are adjusted for clustering within product lines over time. 
See Appendix for variable descriptions 
 
 
